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PTOLEMY’S MILITARY AND POLITICAL OPERATIONS IN GREECE
IN 314–308 BC
The territory of Greece proper played a special role during the fights that broke out among
the generals of Alexander the Great after his death; it was an extremely important stage of
events and an object of interest of the most significant participants in these struggles. As a
result of their geographical location and strategic significance, Greece and Macedonia were
key to victory in the game in which control of Alexander the Great’s whole legacy was at
stake, which was the goal of at least some of the Diadochoi.
Control over Macedonia, as well as the role of regent to Alexander the Great’s
successors (at least until they were alive) was an important bargaining chip in the fight for
influence in the emerging political order. Attempts at achieving these two goals were the
main reasons behind successive wars among the Diadochoi. The territory of Greece proper
was a stage of heavy military operations, which meant that relations with the Greek poleis
were of primary importance to the fighting Diadochoi. Friendly or hostile relations with the
poleis could often significantly influence the fate of campaigns on their territories. Opening
or closing the city gates, or blocking convenient routes, could even seal the fate of a
military operation. Moreover, and equally significantly, friendly relations with the Greek
cities meant that mercenaries could be recruited. All this led to playing the Greek card and
waving the banner of the freedom of the Greek cities, first started by Polyperchon and
followed by others, including Antigonus and Ptolemy. The ability to combine diplomacy
and military operations, always important to succeed, was the key to success on this
extremely complicated territory.
The first signs of Ptolemy’s political activity in Greece appeared as early as 315 BC;
they were related to building a coalition of the Diadochoi against Antigonus I
Monophthalmus. The ambitions of Antigonus, who had the largest military forces and
financial means1 at his disposal since the Treaty of Triparadeisos, and particularly since
Eumenes was eliminated, were focused on controlling the whole state left by Alexander the
Great. In the summer or autumn of 315 BC, Antigonus drove Seleucos’s away from his
Babylonian satrapy; the latter turned to Ptolemy for help.2 Together they formed an alliance
                                                                                                                                                   
1 Antigonus gained Eumenes’ veterans and treasury in Susa: Diod. 19.48.8.
2 Diod. 19.55.1–4. For the date see Errington 1977: 486–487.
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against Antigonus with Cassander who controlled Macedonia and Lysimachus who ruled
Thrace. When Antigonus rejected the ultimatum put forward by the allies, the Third War of
the Successors started (314–311 BC).3
The situation on the Balkan Peninsula was extremely complicated at the time.
Cassander had Macedonia under control, and having got rid of Olympias, he also took over
custody of Alexander the Great’s children. He also managed to subjugate the Epirote
League and Acarnania.4 Cassander made a series of steps to strengthen his position in the
country – he married Alexander’s sister, Thessalonica, he founded the cities of Cassandreia
and Thessalonica. However, there were still Polyperchon and his son Alexander, who had
been fighting against Cassander and the other allied Diadochoi since 319 BC. Cassander
did manage to reduce their influence considerably; he regained most cities on the
Peloponnese, and he could count on the favourable Greek opinion when he rebuilt Thebes
that had been destroyed by Alexander the Great.5 However, Alexander retained control over
Ithome, and his fathered kept his influence over the Aetolians. Both could become
Antigonus’s potential allies.
It is a well-known fact that there was indeed an agreement between Antigonus and
Polyperchon.6 For the latter it might have been the last opportunity to play a significant role
in building a new order. For Antigonus, on the other hand, Polyperchon was an important
ally, capable of engaging Cassander’s forces in Greece, thus making it impossible for him
to cross to Asia and attack Antigonus in the centre of his domains.
Military operations initially led Antigonus to success. The attack on Syria gave him the
majority of ports on the Phoenician coast, which had been controlled by Ptolemy.7 This
success enabled Antigonus to gain an advantage at sea, which he increased further by
founding the Nesiotic League.8 The situation of his allies in Greece also improved
dramatically. Antigonus’s envoy, Aristodemos, managed to recruit 8,000 troops on the
Peloponnese and to bring the leader of the Aetolians over to his side, which neutralised
Acarnania siding with Cassander.9 The bestowal of the title of strategus of Peloponnese on
Polyperchon was of slightly lesser importance, although it could be used for propaganda
and it was a testament to his alliance with Antigonus in the first place.10 The campaigns in
Asia Minor were also successful for Monophthalmus.11 He did not neglect propaganda
either; he called a meeting of Macedonian soldiers which proclaimed Cassander an enemy
of the state and handed over the supreme power to Antigonus. Monophthalmus also played
the Greek card; Greek cities were proclaimed free and the defence of this freedom was,
                                                                                                                                                   
3 The demands included returning Babylon to Seleucos, but the allies also wanted a new division of
territories in Asia Minor and Syria (the latter was to go to Ptolemy) and a distribution of money taken from
Eumenes by Antigonus (Diod. 19.57).
4 SIG 653, 4.
5 Diod. 19.53.2; Paus. 9.7.1–2. Gullath (1982: 86–89) and Errington (1977: 495) date these events to
315 BC, whereas A.B. Bosworth (1992: 81) to 316 BC.
6 Diod. 19.57.5. Antigonus envoy’s task was to conclude the agreement with Polyperchon and
Alexander, but also recruitment of mercenaries, cf. Simpson 1957: 371–373.
7 Only Tyre resisted for a longer time. The Ptolemaic garrison has surrendered in 313 BC: Diod.
19.61.5.
8 For the beginnings of the League of the Islanders see Simpson 1959: 395; Wehrli 1968; Buraselis
1982: 41–43, 60–87.
9 Diod. 19.66.2; 19.67.3.
10 Diod. 19.60.1. For this topic see Bengtson 1937: 167–168.
11 Diod. 19.60.2, cf. Buraselis 1982: 41–44.
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according to the official propaganda, Antigonus’s most important goal. This was a well-
aimed blow, mostly against Cassander for whom friendly relations with the Greek poleis
were key to maintaining control over Greece; regarding this issue he basically continued his
father’s policy, i.e. he based his power on garrisons and supporting pro-Macedonian
oligarchic rulers.
As Lysimachus was struggling with unrest in Thrace,12 the only person who could back
Cassander in Greece was Ptolemy, even though his attention was focused on protecting
Egypt’s eastern borders, which were directly threatened after Antigonus captured Syria.
Ptolemy’s operations focused on the coast of Asia Minor. Ptolemy concentrated his marine
forces on Cyprus and actively supported the satrap of Caria, Asandros, who was fighting
against Antigonus’s general Polemaios at the time.13 Despite such a difficult situation the
satrap of Egypt also became involved in Greece. Probably in the winter of 314–313 BC14 he
issued a declaration of freedom of the Greek poleis.15 This fact is often interpreted as only
intended to counterbalance Antigonus’s policy and to neutralise his act on the same issue.
Certainly this was the prime objective for using this banner. However, Ptolemy’s action
may also be viewed as an introduction to a Greek policy that was much wider in scope. His
declaration, like Antigonus’s, threatened the interests of his ally, Cassander. In this regard
Ptolemy was in a much better situation than his ally; his account was clear of conflicts with
the poleis attached to autonomy.16 Making this catchword a reality would, however, mean
acting in the interests of the opposite side, since it would be connected with suppressing his
ally’s influence in Greece. However, his skilful actions and waving the banner of the
freedom of the cities enhanced Ptolemy’s prospects in future.17
At the moment, though, the Egyptian satrap’s more vested interests were east of Egypt.
A large-scale campaign to Cyprus led to significant success; Ptolemy also lent additional
support to Asandros in Caria. Polykleitos was sent to the Peloponnese with fifty ships, but
he left Greece very soon when he found out that Alexander, son of Polyperchon, went over
to Cassander’s side. Although Polykleitos’s quick return to the Pamphilian Sea may
indicate the Egyptian satrap’s scant interest in Greek matters, it does not necessarily have to
be a full picture of his intents. Greece was undoubtedly a front of second importance to
Ptolemy. The forces at Polykleitos’s disposal were not large enough to enable him large-
scale operations; besides, a too independent operation would mean, as mentioned above,
undermining Cassander and consequently strengthening Antigonus’s position. However,
the forces were strong enough to demonstrate his presence in Greece and to gain a foothold
for future. Moreover, Alexander’s defection to Antigonus’s side led to a significant change
                                                                                                                                                   
12 Diod. 19.73.1–10.
13 Diod.19.62.2–3. At this time Ptolemy’s relations with Rhodes became loose (cf. Moser 1914: 64–66)
and Seleucus’s earlier expedition ended in an unsuccessful siege of Eritrea (Diod. 19.60.4). Asandros has
earlier supported the Athenians against Antigonus (IG II/III 1, 450, see O’Sullivan 1997: 107–116; Lambert
1999: 129–130).
14 For the date see Errington 1977: 497; Huss 2001: 150.
15 Ptolemy could only be held responsible for the relations in the cities of Cyrenaica at the time. The
diagramma he issued there (SEG IX 1) that regulated matters in the region gave him control over the cities
there and his interests were supported by military garrisons (Fraser 1956–1958: 120–127; Hölbl 2001: 15;
Huss 2001: 100, note 30).
16 Green (1990: 26) is definitely right in saying that by concluding that his final opponent would be the
victor of the conflict between Cassander and Antigonus, Ptolemy was already securing future means of
propaganda. Cf. also Simpson 1959: 390; Will 1979: 56–57.
17 Diod. 19.62.5; 19.64.3–5.
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in the distribution of forces and meant that Polykleitos’s expedition was no longer an
important reinforcement for Cassander. Additionally, the way the situation in Asia Minor
unfolded hastened the decision for Polykleitos to leave the Peloponnese. Diodorus’s
account (19.64.5): Àkousen Óti QeÒdotoj m◊n Ð AntigÒnou naÚarcoj œk Pat£rwn tÁj
Luk∂aj paraple√ ta√j ¢pÕ `RÒdou naus∂n, œcoÚsaij ¢pÕ Kar∂aj plhpèmata indicates
that Antigonus’s troops were successful in Caria. The return of Ptolemy’s admiral was
successful, since he managed to defeat a fleet led by Theodotos near Aphrodisias and to
destroy Perilaos’s land troops accompanying the fleet.18 This victory may have been
particularly significant for Ptolemy’s troops operating on Cyprus. In the wake of these
successes, Ptolemy attempted to finish the war, which indicates that the progress of military
operations was generally unfavourable for him and his forces were on the wane. The way
subsequent military operations unfolded confirms this, particularly given the fact that in
313 BC it was Cassander who, despite difficult operations in Greece, had to give Ptolemy
support in Caria.19 Ptolemy’s negotiations with Antigonus, however, ended in fiasco.20
In the following years Ptolemy was unable to actively join the war in Greece even
though the events of 312–311 BC brought a lot of success to Antigonus’s generals (mainly
Polemaios) who had, apart from military forces, powerful support as a result of the popular
catchword of the freedom of the poleis.21 However, Ptolemy himself was in an
unfavourable situation. He had lost almost all of Caria, he had to deal with a revolt in
Cyrenaica, he had to personally intervene on Cyprus to defend his interests, and the war
over Syria against Antigonus, fought with varying success, ended in failure and this
important land was impossible to recapture.22
In 311 BC the Diadochoi signed a peace treaty which in Ptolemy’s case meant a
confirmation of his reign (naturally preserving the idea of unity of Alexander the Great’s
state) in Egypt, the cities of “Libia” and “Arabia”, while his claims to Cyrenaica, Celesyria
and Cyprus were passed over in silence.23 Such a treaty could not be satisfying to Ptolemy;
in any case, it was also a moment of quiet for the other participants in this grand play
before the final clash. On the one hand Antigonus Monophthalmus could consider himself a
victor – without abandoning his universalistic plans, he was given a free hand in Asia (the
treaty e.g. did not settle the matter of Seleucus).24 On the other hand, Cassander was
confirmed as strategus of Europe until Alexander IV came of age (which meant the boy’s
chances of survival were slim) and could count on rebuilding the position he had lost in
                                                                                                                                                   
18 Diod. 19.64.5–78. Possibly the fleet Polykleitos intercepted was headed to Cyprus, which would
confirm how grave the situation was (Huss 2001: 152, 446).
19 Diod. 19.68.2–7. Naturally, Cassander acted with his own interest in mind first; Antigonus
controlling the situation in western Asia Minor would enable him to cross to Europe and attack Cassander
directly in Macedonia and Greece. For the policy of Cassander: Buraselis 1982: 5–37.
20 For the negotiations see Simpson 1954.
21 By the end of 312 Cassander had lost his influence in the whole of Greece, and ultimately also in
Athens; his operation on Euboea ended in fiasco. Individual fighting spots remained only in northern and
western parts of the Peloponnese and on the coast of the Ionian Sea. For those military operations see
Simpson 1955: 36–37; Huss 2001; 158–159.
22 Diod. 19.75–93; Milet I. 3, no.123.3–4; I. 7, no. 244, see Hölbl 2001: 18; Huss 2001: 159–165. The
one and only success of the coalition was the return of Seleucus to Babylon.
23 Diod. 19.105. It is not clear whether the phrase cities in “Libia” covers the poleis of Cyrenaica (so
Moser 1914: 36 contra Will 1960: 374; Hölbl 2001: 18). For more information on the treatise and the
meaning of specific names cf. Braunert 1964: 84–88; Schmitt 1969: nr 428; Will 1979: 61–65; Buraselis
1982: 11–22; Mehl 1986: 120–129; Huss 2001: 166–169.
24 Cf. Simpson 1954: 29–30; Mehl 1986: 121–128.
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Greece. Lysimachus, who did not get too involved in military operations anyway, could
focus on strengthening his position in Thrace and impose his rule on Thracian and Scythian
dynasts. All in all, however, it was Ptolemy who had the best reasons for a quick clash and
dealing new cards. It should be remembered that the peace negotiations of 311 BC initially
got under way without Ptolemy’s participation. Whether the peace initiative was put
forward by Cassander or Antigonus,25 it is certain that Cassander contacted only
Lysimachus; it cannot be excluded that the reason for this was Cassander’s mistrust of
Ptolemy’s plans for Greece. Having found out about the treaty signed by the remaining
sides of the conflict, the satrap of Egypt, unable to risk isolation in the face of the conflict
with Antigonus, acceded to the treaty himself.26
It cannot be ruled out, however, that Ptolemy intentionally reconciled himself to losing
Cyprus and Syria temporarily, keeping his eye (as the subsequent events showed) on a
much bigger goal, i.e. taking control of the whole Argead state. Macedonia and Greece
must have been at the centre of such goals.27 The international situation seemed to favour
such plans. Cassander had been weakened by the recent war, Lysimachus was engrossed in
the matters of his own satrapy, and Antigonus had to focus his energy on driving Seleucus
out of Babylonia.
Ptolemy’s first step, however, was a series of operations on the coasts of Cilicia, Lycia
and Caria. First, in 311 BC, he sent an expedition under the leadership of Leonides, which
was somewhat successful in Cilicia, but the acquisitions were short-lived. Ptolemy’s main
action took place in the two subsequent years. He managed to seize a number of cities and
regain control over Cyprus.28 Beginning the operation in Asia Minor, Ptolemy invoked the
provision about the freedom of the Greek cities in the 311 BC treaty, officially defending
them against Antigonus, who supposedly did not abide by it. However, this catchword also
obviously threatened Cassander’s interests. Ptolemy’s intensive propaganda in Greece
indicates that it was this state that was the satrap of Egypt’s main goal. Ptolemy’s envoys
also campaigned in cities under Lysimachus’s control.29 What was an extremely important
element of this campaign was financial participation in the rebuilding of Thebes, to which
cause the king of Sidon, Philokles (probably in the service of the satrap of Egypt), made a
contribution.30
The fact that Ptolemy chose the island of Kos as his headquarters also indicates serious
plans with regard to Greece. This strategically situated island was ideal for sounding out the
mood in Greece and for implementing an active policy on its territory. Obtaining detailed
information about Greek affairs was all the more important since the situation was far from
clear. The most active representative of Antigonus’s interests so far, his nephew Polemaios,
who had had considerable success in the recent war, had far greater ambitions, which the
status quo of 311 BC did not satisfy. As a result of military operations, he had gained a
                                                                                                                                                   
25 For the former see Huss 2001: 166; for the latter: see Simpson 1954: 27; cf. OGIS 5; Buraselis 1982:
18–19.
26 OGIS 5, ll.29–31.
27 Lehmann 1988: 137 n. 34, believes that it was only the agreement with Polemaios that prompted
Ptolemy’s operation in Greece, cf. Buraselis 1982: 47–49; Huss 2001; 169–170.
28 Diod. 20.19.2–5; 20.21.1–3; Plut., Dem. 7.5. Cf. Gesche 1974: 103–125; Bagnall 1976: 39–42;
Wörrle 1977: 51 n. 46; Hölbl 2001: 19.
29 Diod. 20.19.4.
30 IG VII, 2419, col. II, ll. 2–4 = SIG 337, ll. 20–22. The same list of donors mentions Philocles twice,
probably in 308. For Philocles see Moser 1914: 97–122; Hauben 1970: 1–8; Merker 1970: 141–160.
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strong position in central Greece and there are many indications that he had counted on
independent reign over the Greek territories. However, the guarantee of the freedom of the
poleis included in the peace treaty dashed these hopes. To reach his goals, Polemaios
needed allies, while he was also a valuable partner for any potential partner. He represented
a considerable force in the region, with the mighty fortress of Chalcis on Euboea at the
centre of his influence. Moreover, which could be particularly significant, Polemaios
controlled Phrygia Minor, thus blocking Antigonus’s way through Hellespont to Europe.
Polyperchon also became active, deciding to use Alexander the Great’s son, Heracles.
Having brought him and his mother from Pergamon to Greece (likely in agreement with
Antigonus), he declared him king of Macedonia. Polyperchon managed to enlist the support
of a considerable number of Greeks, which enabled him to recruit mercenaries and secure
Aetolian reinforcements. Cassander’s situation was further complicated by the fact that
Heracles found allies in Macedonia, too.31 However, Cassander quickly moved to neutralise
this threat; Polyperchon agreed to eliminate his protégé in exchange for the title of
strategus of the Pelopponese, as well as privileges and reinforcements. Around that time
Cassander also had the teenage Alexander IV and his mother murdered, finally solving the
problem of accession to the throne in the Argead dynasty and paving the way to a sole reign
of Macedonia, although there are many indications that their deaths were kept secret for the
moment.32
Ptolemy established contact with Ptolemaios. The steps the latter took seem
complicated in the light of Diodorus’s account. The relevant fragments of Diodorus’s
narrative (20.19.2; 20.27.3) related to Polemaios’s negotiations with Cassander and
Ptolemy are so similar to each other that it seems justified to ask whether the Greek
historian meant one and the same event. The description of negotiations between Ptolemy
and Polemaios suggests that the first contacts between the two generals occurred even
before Ptolemy arrived on Kos in 309 BC.33 It seems, therefore, that there was no time for
an earlier treaty between Polemaios and Cassander, although this is not the most significant
argument. It would have been natural for Ptolemy, who personally engaged in large scale
operations on the coast of Asia Minor in 309 BC, and had plans for an intervention in
Greece, to seek an ally in Greece at the beginning of his move; an ally who could provide
valuable support particularly in the initial stages of the operation. Diodorus’s account
clearly indicates that the contact was established on Polemaios’s initiative; however,
looking from his perspective, it was Ptolemy, acting against Antigonus, who was a natural
partner of negotiations. An analysis of Polemaios’s motives is another reason to doubt the
existence of an agreement between him and Cassander. At first glance, Polemaios’s attempt
at gaining independence from his uncle could make Cassander, recently an enemy of
Antigonus, his natural ally. However, each attempt at increasing his influences in Greece
must have meant a conflict with Cassander as well. Of course it is also possible that
                                                                                                                                                   
31 Diod. 20.20.1–4.
32 Marmor Parium, FGrH 239, B18; Diod. 19.105.2; Paus. 9.7.2; Pomp. Trog. per. 15; Just. 15.2.3–5.
Chronology of the deaths of Alexander the Great’s children is very complicated. Cf. Hammond 1989: 266–
269; 167; Green 1990: 28, 747 n. 37; Carney 2000: 147–150.
33 Diod. 20.27.3: e≥j t¾n Kîn pleÚsaj metep◊mfato Polema√on Öj ín ¢delfidoàj `AntigÒnou kaπ
dÚnamin pepisteumenoj toàton m◊n kat◊lipe prÕj d◊ Ptolema√ou koinoprag∂an œt∂qeto. Obviously
Ptolemy who is mentioned by Diodorus, is in fact Polemaios (cf. Seibert 1983: 219–221, with
bibliography). Moser 1914: 38 even believes that the alliance itself had been agreed upon before Ptolemy
arrived on Kos, but Diodorus’s account does not provide a clear answer.
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Polemaios, realising this, signed a tactical alliance with Cassander, treating him as an ally
against his uncle, and he established contact with Ptolemy only after Cassander made an
agreement with Polyperchon, which practically ruined the possibility of implementing
Polemaios’s plans in Greece. However, there is no evidence that at the time of negotiations
with Ptolemy Polemaios knew about the agreement between Cassander and Polyperchon,
whose talks were carried out in strict secrecy.34 Moreover, there is no mention whatsoever
of Polemaios’s reaction to Polyperchon’s acts, which threatened not only Cassander but
also his own interests. If there had been an alliance between Polemaios and Cassander, it
would have been natural for them to undertake a joint action against Polyperchon.
Therefore, it can’t be excluded that Diodorus made an error and the agreement between
Polemaios and Cassander did not exist.35
Polemaios was a very valuable ally for Ptolemy. As has been mentioned, he not only
controlled a number of cities in Greece, including Chalcis, but also, being in possession of
Phrygia Minor, controlled the passage from Asia to Europe; finally, he had considerable
military forces at his disposal.36 Gaining such a trump card in the game against Antigonus
in the Aegean Sea and Seleucos’s successes in the war against Monophthalmus in Asia37
provided grounds for Ptolemy’s more decisive operations in Asia Minor and Greece, where,
as a result of the existing status quo, the propaganda presenting the satrap of Egypt as a
veritable defender of the freedom of the Greek cities could have met with particularly
favourable reception. However, Ptolemy’s cooperation with Polemaios did not last long.
During their meeting on Kos, Ptolemy had his partner killed, considering him, according to
Diodorus (20.27.3), to be too ambitious and dangerous. The ease with which Ptolemy got
rid of a newly gained ally, even if the latter really had, as Diodorus says, canvassed among
the officers and soldiers of his partner, prompts researchers to look for deeper reasons of
such an abrupt end to the co-operation. Possibly, Polemaios was a victim of a new
diplomatic initiative of Ptolemy, who unexpectedly entered into agreement with
Antigonus’s son Demetrius, acting on his father’s behalf, around that time.38 The historicity
of this agreement, not mentioned by Diodorus, who provides a continuous account of the
War of the Diadochoi, is doubtful in the eyes of many historians.39 It seems, though, that
the Liber Suda passage reporting such an agreement could be regarded as reliable40 and an
explanation of this unexpected alliance may be found in the situation and events at the time.
On the eve of his intervention in Greece, Ptolemy would have profited from the isolation of
                                                                                                                                                   
34 Differently Bakhuizen (1970: 127–128), who believes that the agreement between Polyperchon and
Cassander was the reason for that Polemaios went over to Ptolemy’s side.
35 Similarly Moser 1914: 37–38 contra Simpson 1959: 404; Buraselis 1982: 46; Huss 2001: 172; cf.
Wörrle 1970: 49–50.
36 Diod. 19.77.2; 19.78.2; 20.27.2; SIG 184. According to Diodorus he had during the operations in
313–312 B.C. 5000 infantry, 500 cavalry and 150 battle ships. However, Antigonus has ordered the big part
of the fleet back from Greece before the peace in 311 BC was concluded.
37 See Mehl 1986: 129–137; Bosworth 2002: 225–245.
38 So e.g. Moser 1914: 45 contra Bakhuizen 1970: 127–128; Huss 2001: 174. Bouché-Leclerq (1903:
60) believes that the reason for Polemaios’s death was his plan to ally himself with Cassander, but it seems
unlikely at the moment.
39 Bouché-Leclerq 1903: 63, 66; Buraselis 1982: 50. That the agreement did exist believe: Dürrbach
1907: 220–221; Moser 1914: 47–50; Simpson 1959: 404; Will 1979: 69; Bakhuizen 124; Green 1990: 29;
Huss 2001: 176.
40 Suda s.v. Dhmˇtrioj Ð `AntigÒnou. For this passage of the text and its sources see Moser 1914: 47–
49; Schmitt 1969: nr 433.
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Cassander and Polyperchon, who were his two main rivals on the territory then. He would
also have protected his rear against a possible attack by Antigonus, which could have made
his operations in Greece considerably easier. Monophthalmus probably also accepted
Ptolemy’s conquests in Asia Minor since historical sources do not mention his preparations
to regain the lost cities and it is difficult to presume that he did not address this issue, even
if he was occupied with his fight against Seleucus. Possibly an agreement with Ptolemy
was necessary for him precisely because it would have enabled him to devote more energy
to the fight on other territories. Everything points to the conclusion that until Demetrius’s
307 BC expedition Antigonus had not undertaken any specific actions in Greece or on the
Aegean islands, only intervening in Phrygia Minor to protect the Hellespont.41
The agreement between Antigonus and Ptolemy officially provided that “the whole of
Greece would be freed,” and the events in Boeotia gave Ptolemy a convenient pretext.
During his march towards the Peloponnese, Polyperchon was not let through by the
Boeotians, which forced him to spend the winter in Locride.42 Interestingly enough, the
Boeotians were supported by the Peloponnesians, who could have been influenced by
Cratesipolis, the widow of Polyperchon’s son murdered in 314 BC, who reigned in Corinth
and Sicyon. After Ptolemy’s forces landed in Greece in 308 BC, she co-operated with
Ptolemy. Cratesipolis was greatly esteemed and it is likely that it was her, alone or in
alliance with the satrap of Egypt already at that point, that contributed to the Peloponnesian
troops supporting the Boeotians. A request for Ptolemy’s help gave him a wonderful
opportunity to play the role of defender of the Greeks’ freedom and to begin direct military
operations.43 In any event, even if the actions were not inspired by Ptolemy, indirectly
(through Cratesipolis) or directly, Polyperchon’s march could not have influenced the
satrap of Egypt’s steps, as it is unlikely that Ptolemy made his decision to land in Greece
dependent on Polyperchon’s attempt at returning to the Peloponnese.44
However, Ptolemy made much more far-ranging steps by beginning to court Cleopatra,
the sister of Alexander the Great and the last living member of the Argead family.45 She
had been at Sardes, under Antigonus’s control, for a long time. Ptolemy’s marriage
proposal gave her an opportunity to play an active political role again and to reach for
power; considering her bad relations with Antigonus and Argeads’ blood on Cassander’s
hands,46 Ptolemy was the only candidate she could accept.47 Regardless of whether
Alexander IV’s death was known at the time and therefore Ptolemy wanted to take
                                                                                                                                                   
41 Diod. 20.19.5.
42 Diod. 20.28.4.
43 Describing these events, Diodorus does not mention directly the Peloponnesian cities turning to
Ptolemy for help, but this is indicated in another fragment of his narrative (20.37.2).
44 Bakhuizen (1970: 125) believes so but the chain of events and Ptolemy’s moves do not provide a
basis for such an assumption.
45 Diod. 20.37.3. The hypothesis of Moser (1914: 45) that the marriage between Cleopatra and Ptolemy
was a part of the agreement between Antigonus and Ptolemy is unlikely.
46 Even if the fact that Alexander the Great’s children had died was not known yet, then Cassander was
behind Olympias’s death and Olympias (Diod. 19.36; Just. 14.6.1–12) and Antigonus’s noisy propaganda
campaign implied he had had a hand in Alexander’s death. (Paus. 1.25.6; Just. 12.14).
47 Differently Carney (2000: 127–128), who means that Cleopatra hadn’t got hopes of royal power and
she only was afraid of her life.
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advantage of Cleopatra to take over the job of the young ruler’s regent, by marrying
Cleopatra Ptolemy had an opportunity to take control of Macedonia.48
Ptolemy’s expedition proper started in the spring of 308 BC and it turned out that the
diplomacy had prepared the operation well. Sailing from the Carian port of Myndos past
the Cyclades towards the Peloponnese, Ptolemy assumed the role of the guarantor of the
freedom of the poleis already on his way. On Andros, he ordered Antigonus’s garrison to
leave the island, which indicates that the agreement with Demetrius had been broken.49 A
gold kylix offered up in the temple of Aphrodite on Delos, which was the religious centre
of the Cyclades,50 is also a testimony of Ptolemy’s propaganda efforts in the region. Similar
gifts were offered up by Ptolemy’s generals, Leonides, Kallikrates and Polyklitos.51 The
satrap of Egypt certainly understood the strategic significance of the islands of this
archipelago, and the long stay on Kos is in itself a testament to how much significance
Ptolemy attached to the region. First of all, possession of these islands opened the way to
the Balkans, it made efficient fight for the control of the Aegean Sea possible, and also
provided access to lucrative trade routes. It may be presumed that the majority of Ptolemy’s
operations at the time were aimed at winning advantage at sea. Ptolemy’s fleet, with bases
on Cyprus at its disposal, could easily operate in the Cilician waters and hold Antigonus’s
forces in Syria and Asia Minor in check. Therefore, interest in the Cyclades, a natural
bridge between Greece and Asia Minor, went beyond the current Greek plans.
Ptolemy landed in the Corinthian port of Kenchreai, where he used the Panhellenic
Isthmian Games for propagating his campaign.52 As a result of an agreement with
Cratesipolis, he took over control of the two most important Peloponnesian cities in her
possession: Corinth and Sicyon.53 Although Polyainos tells us that the mercenary garrison
guarding Acrocorinth was against passing the fortress over to Ptolemy, but it is possible
that their resistance was a result of Cratesipolis failing to meet their demands rather than a
reflection of their anti-Ptolemy attitude. Finally, thanks to Cratesipolis’s stratagem Corinth
also fell into Ptolemy’s hands without a fight. The conquest and garrisoning of Megara
secured the Isthmus against an attack from the north.54 Controlling these strategically most
significant cities on the Peloponnese paved the way for conquering the whole of southern
Greece, which was the apparent aim of the expedition.55 The most dangerous rivals were
not in a favourable situation at the time. Polyperchon was embroiled in fighting,
                                                                                                                                                   
48 Hammond (1989: 267) put the hypothesis, that Ptolemy’ plan was to unite, with the help of
Cleopatra, the Macedonian world as a “manager and general” of Alexander. However chronology of the
deaths of Alexander The Great’s sons is very complicated, see n. 32).
49 Moser 1914: 51 believes that it was not a move against Antigonus since Ptolemy assumed the role of
the defender of the freedom of the Greek cities, and Diodorus’s narrative seems to imply that the garrison
was removed without a fight on Antigonus’s orders. It is difficult to agree with this reasoning, however,
since this was against Antigonus’s interests in the Aegean region.
50 IG XI.2.161; Inscriptions de Délos, Paris 1926, no. 296 and 313; Since Ptolemy’s name in the
inscription is without the royal title, which he took in 305, and prior to 309 and after 308 the island was
under Antigonus’s control, the gift must have been offered up either during preparations or during
Ptolemy’s expedition to Greece.
51 Homolle 1890: 406–407; Schulhof 1908: 65.
52 Ptolemy probably has participated in preparations to the Games, cf. Suda s.v. Dhmˇtrioj Ð
`AntigÒnou.
53 Diod. 20.37.1–2; Plut., Dem. 15.1.3; Polyan. 8.58
54 Diog. Laert. 2.115.
55 Diod. 20.37.2 states that Ptolemy planned to free the other Greek cities, because it was a purpose of
Ptolemy according to his propaganda.
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Cassander’s reign in Macedonia and Thessaly was unthreatened but there had been voices
in Macedonia that he should return power to a descendant of Alexander the Great.56 He had
to take into account unrest because of his role in the murder of Alexander the Great’s
children, and his enemies’ skilful propaganda could also use Olympias’s death to
undermine his position in the Macedonian monarchy.
Thus Ptolemy gained important footholds on the Peloponnese and had favourable
conditions to expand his propaganda campaign, spreading the freedom of the Greek cities.
This could have been a strong weapon, especially considering Cassander’s policy, which
based his position in Greece on manning garrisons and supporting authorities that favoured
him. Ptolemy did not limit himself to the catchword of the freedom of the poleis. His son,
Lagos, participated in the chariot race in the Arcadian Lykaia in 308–307 BC, which
certainly was a gesture towards the Peloponnesian communities.57 It is possible that the
statue of Demetrius and Ptolemy crowned by Elias erected in Olympia and the votive gift
offered up in the same place by Ptolemy should be dated to this period.58 Although
Pausanias reported that Ptolemy signed his name as Macedonian, whereas in fact he was
the king of Egypt, such an inscription on the base of the sculpture may indeed indicate that
it dates from before Ptolemy took the title of king. Moreover, Pausanias may have called
him king due to the fact that in his time Ptolemy was mostly remembered as king of Egypt
and the founder of the Lagids dynasty.
Corinth was of particular importance among the cities conquered by Ptolemy, as it was
the centre of the League of Corinth founded by Philip in 337 BC, whose hegemonist was
originally Philip and then his son. After Alexander’s death, as a result of the Lamian war,
its existence de facto ended. Unfortunately it is impossible to say unambiguously whether
Ptolemy intended to revive the League or create a new one, modelled on it to some extent.
Luckily for Ptolemy, the year of his Greek expedition coincided with the Olympic Games,
which gave him a particularly good opportunity to manifest his intentions, especially
proclaiming the freedom of the Greek cities. It is possible that the Liber Suda account (s.v.
Dhmˇtrioj Ð `AntigÒnou: aÙtonÒmouj... d¾ t¦j ple∂staj tîn `Ellhn∂don pÒlewn ¢f∂hsi) is
an echo of such a public declaration. Titus Flamininus used similar circumstances to
proclaim the freedom of the Greek states on behalf of Rome in 196 BC. Such a step by
Ptolemy, although not confirmed by historical sources, would be logical, and the silence of
Diodorus, who provided a continuous account of these years, is not conclusive, especially
since he mentioned Ptolemy’s plans to free other Greek cities,59 which could have been a
trace of such a public declaration. However, the matter of reviving the League of Corinth is
different, even though there is an analogy. It was in 302 BC at the Isthmus of Corinth that
Demetrius Poliorcetes (following the orders of his father from 306 BC) called a congress
during which the Hellenic League, an extension of the League of Corinth, was formed.60
However, reasons for attributing similar intentions to Ptolemy are too scant. In Athenaeus’s
citation of Kallixeinos’s account of the famous pompé organised by Ptolemy II, a statue
symbolising the city of Corinth was carried.61 This does not necessarily indicate a reference
                                                                                                                                                   
56 Diod. 19.105.2.
57 IG V 2, 550.
58 Paus. 6.3.1; 6.16.3.
59 Diod. 20.37.2.
60 For that topic see Seibert 1983: 148–153, see also for further reading.
61 Athen. 5.196a–203b = Kallikseinos of Rodos, FGrH 627, F2. Reading of the text is not clear, see
Huss 2001: 177 n. 642. On pompé in the Ptolemaic propaganda see also Fraser 1972: I, 193, 231–232, Rise
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to the renewal of the League of Corinth by the founder of the dynasty. It could have been a
reference to Ptolemy’s whole Greek campaign and the whole dynasty acting as defenders of
the Greeks. Such a theme was often present in the foreign policy of the Lagids, and in this
case Corinth was the most important place where Ptolemy I had been present. A cortege of
women walking in the procession had a similar symbolic meaning; it was a reference to
Ptolemy freeing Asian Minor cities. It is also possible that if Ptolemy had indeed planned to
form a League on the Greek territory, it would have had, at least initially, more limited
reach and would have included the Peloponnesian cities which were the resource base for
his operations. Similarly, Antigonus Monophthalmus implemented the catchword of the
freedom of the poleis by entering many-sided military alliances, such as the Nesiotic
League, or the renewed League of Corinth. It would have been natural, therefore, for
Ptolemy to strive to form an alliance with the Peloponnesian cities, and historical sources
indeed mention co-operation.62 In any case Ptolemy was not the first to attempt to form
such a league – in 318 BC Polyperchon intended to form such a symmachia. If we assume
that the ancient accounts that have survived to our times indeed passed over Ptolemy
forming a League on the Greek territory in silence, it is more likely that it would have been
indeed more ephemeral and limited in scope than a Panhellenic initiative invoking Philip’s
ideas. Although it cannot be categorically excluded, it must remain in the sphere of
speculation.
Ptolemy’s propaganda, however, met with unenthusiastic response of the Greeks. It can
be assumed that they had managed to become more resistant to the idea of the freedom of
the polis that the Diadochi used instrumentally. Moreover, Peloponnesian cities were to
finance their own independence.63 It was the failure to supply the promised grain and
money that Ptolemy used as a pretext to quit active operations in Greece. The reasons why
Ptolemy abandoned Greek matters so easily and went back to Egypt were a subject of many
attempted explanations by researchers. In this context, historians mentioned fears connected
with the attack of Agathocles and Ophellas in Africa, and the latter becoming independent
of Ptolemy in approximately 309–308 BC.64 It seems that a host of factors were at work.
Ptolemy could have concluded that in view of the relatively small response to his actions
among the Greeks, especially little willingness on the part of the poleis to engage in active
fight by his side, the whole campaign would be more difficult than he could have expected
and would have engaged his forces for longer than he could afford it. It is quite possible
that the forces involved in the expedition were not very large, since it had been expected
that the Greeks themselves would lend considerable support. Finally, whatever plans
Ptolemy might have had in connection with Alexander the Great’s sister, at that point they
                                                                                                                                                   
1983: 45–115; Hazzard 2000: 66–75; Thompson 2000. Billows (1990: 15, n. 19) believes that Ptolemy
envisaged a restoration of Leauge of Corinth.
62 Diod. 20.37.2.
63 Diod. 20.37.2.
64 The precise dating of Ophellas’s emancipation from Ptolemy’s power is a contentious issue, see
Mørkholm 1980: 147; Laronde 1987: 356–358; Huss 2001: 179. G. Horat Zuffa (1971/1972) proposed a
completely different interpretation with regard to the goals of Ptolemy’s operation, concluding that
Ptolemy’s Greek expedition was in consultation with Cassander and against Antigonus. An indication of
this would be e.g. Ophellas recruiting soldiers and colonists in Athens; since it was ruled by Cassander’s
supporters, it would only have been possible with his consent. However, Ophellas was more likely acting on
his own in connection with his African campaign with Agathocles (Diod. 20.40.5 mentions this event in this
context). In this case the fact would not only deny Ptolemy’s anti-Cassander goals, but it would rather
confirm them.
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had been most likely thwarted. Probably before Ptolemy left Greece, he had received
information about Cleopatra’s elimination on Antigonus’s orders.65 Her death must have
also made Ptolemy reconsider the point of his expedition. All those factors played a role in
Ptolemy’s decision to work out a truce with Cassander.66
In any event, Ptolemy was not abandoning Greek matters completely when he left the
Peloponnese in 308 BC. He left his garrisons in Corinth and Sicyon, which did contradict
his image of the liberator of the Greek cities, but it gave him a real opportunity to return to
the Greek issue in future. Coins made in Egypt show that Ptolemy treated the cities as an
integral part of the territory under his direct rule.67 He left Leonides behind to protect his
interests.68 All this indicates that Ptolemy treated his absence in Greece as a temporary
measure and it is difficult to believe that the Lagid considered the territory too remote for
further operations. The three cities under his control gave him an excellent strategic
position for future operations. However, history took a different turn and the subsequent
events – Demetrius Poliorcetes in Greece, difficult fights over Cyprus, the threat of
Antigonus’s direct invasion in Egypt, another secession of Cyrene – meant that Ptolemy did
not launch further military operations in Greece, and the footholds that he had won there
were lost.69 Demetrius Poliorcetes’s successes in Greece also stemmed from the fact that
his actions were grounded in Antigonus’s, and particularly Polemaios’s, earlier
accomplishments, whereas Ptolemy’s catchword of freeing the Greek cities lacked this
reference to past events. Nevertheless, despite the ultimate fiasco of the 308 BC expedition,
subsequent rulers of the Lagid dynasty could refer to their ancestor’s operations in the
Aegean Sea in their policy.
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